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T HE GRADUAL INTRODUCTION of com-petitive village elections across Chinahas drawn considerable attention from
policy-makers, scholars and analysts both
within China and abroad. The idea that non-
Party members could stand for office and
that villagers themselves could directly elect
their own leaders seemed to suggest a
seismic change in the way Chinese politics
was ordered. Reports of vote-buying, cla-
nism and interference from higher-level au-
thorities in the electoral processes has muted
some of that initial euphoria. Less well
known is that the introduction of competitive
elections has led to a decline in the nume-
rical representation of women on village
committees.
According to the Ministry of Civil Affairs,
female representation on village committees
dropped from 30 to 16% after 1998 when the
Organic Law on Village Committees became
permanent.1 The vast majority of village chairs
and village committee members are thus male.
How could this be in a country where the lea-
ding political force, namely the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP), has long promoted
gender equality and where a long-established
women’s national machinery, namely the All-
China Women’s Federation, exists to promote
women’s rights and interests?
This paper examines the gendered nature
of village elections in China. The common
explanation for women’s underrepresen-
tation in political leadership positions put
forward by the Party/state and the All-
China Women’s Federation is the legacy of
enduring sexist attitudes that predate the
Liberation of China and the concomitant
internalisation by women of a sense of in-
feriority. It is argued here that this under-
standing of women’s subordination in the
political sphere overlooks the significance of
institutional, structural and political-cultural
factors, which has implications for the nature
of interventions aimed at bringing women
into politics.
The paper begins by providing an over-
view of the development of village elections
in China. This discusses some of the contro-
versies surrounding the idea of competitive
elections, the issues that have arisen, and the
way the elections have been treated in the
literature. In the second part, the paper
examines the gendered nature of village
committees and situates this within the
broader context of female political partici-
pation in China. We then go on to examine
the specific factors which constrain women’s
participation in village elections. In doing so
we draw upon the findings of fieldwork
1. “More Women Getting Political,” China Daily
(September 9th, 2004), accessed on www.china.org.cn.
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carried out in Hunan and Shandong pro-
vinces.2 In the final section, we consider
some of the factors which might enhance in
the future women’s political participation.
The Rise of Village Elections
Following the onset of market-oriented eco-
nomic reforms from 1978 onwards the struc-
ture of China’s economy and society began to
change fundamentally. In rural areas decollec-
tivisation, the rapid spread of the “household
responsibility system” and the relaxation of
controls over rural-urban mobility gradually
altered not only the previous collective sys-
tems of agricultural production but also the po-
litical, administrative and social fabric of
village life. With the replacement of the
commune system by township governments in
the early 1980s and the concomitant collapse
of production teams and brigades, there was
initially no clear, comprehensive system or ad-
ministrative structure for organising village af-
fairs. Villagers were increasingly focussed on
tending their household plots and making the
most of new opportunities to diversify and in-
crease their incomes, whilst political cadres,
too, began to shun political mobilisation work
in favour of enhancing their family incomes.
Though the 1982 Constitution sanctioned
the idea of elections for village committees,
there was no legislation, detailed regulations
or procedures in place to guide the conduct of
elections. Against this background of politico-
administrative restructuring and market incen-
tives the management of village affairs became
increasingly ad hoc. In some parts of China,
villages were said to be out of control, with
local mafias, clan rivalry and corruption
dominating local politics, whilst in other parts
any political or management work had comple-
tely stagnated [Wang 1996]. For many
township authorities the new village commit-
tees were no different from the former produc-
tion brigades and they continued to appoint
village leaders rather than arrange competitive
elections as required by the new Constitution.
However, in some places in the early 1980s,
such as Guangxi province, villagers had begun
to experiment with electing their leaders for
the village committee.
Concerned about the administrative confu-
sion in rural areas and indeed lawlessness in
some villages, officials in the Ministry of Civil
Affairs were keen to find functioning models
of village committees that might be propagated
across the rest of the country. Reports of vil-
lagers choosing their own leaders drew the at-
tention of forward-looking officials in the
Ministry and of central government leaders
2. This paper draws upon research carried out in Hunan
and Shandong provinces in 2003. Semi-structured inter-
views were carried out with provincial, county and
township officials from relevant Party and government
organs, with village heads, Party secretaries, women’s
committee heads in 4 counties and 12 villages in Hunan
province and in 1 township and 3 villages in Shandong
province. Research has also been carried out in 5 villages
in 3 townships in 1 county in Jilin province and the ana-
lysis of this is still underway. The research involved also
a pilot study in 2 townships and 3 villages in Qianxi
County, Hebei province in 2002. The research was carried
out together with Du Jie, from the Women’s Studies Re-
search Institute under the All-China Women’s Federation
in Beijing. I am grateful to the Ford Foundation China for
funding this research and for the support provided throug-
hout the research process. I take sole responsibility for the




who saw the opportunity to introduce an ex-
periment in China that has since been dubbed
as “the silent revolution.”
The decade of the 1980s saw the gradual
introduction of the idea of democratic competi-
tive village elections across the country. In No-
vember 1987, the National People’s Congress
passed the Experimental Organic Law of Vil-
lage Elections, which came into effect from
June 1988. Its experimental status, however,
indicated that the idea was not wholly accepted
amongst central Party leaders. It was not until
1998 that the law achieved permanent status,
thus signalling the Party’s acceptance of this
new system of rural governance.
The journey towards the institutionalisation
of village elections has, however, been fraught,
encountering resistance along the way from
some central Party and government leaders and
particularly from county and township govern-
ment officials, who have the closest interaction
with villagers. Advocates of village elections
could be found amongst central Party and go-
vernment structures, such as Peng Zhen,
former Chair of the National People’s
Congress Standing Committee, amongst lea-
ders within the Ministry of Civil Affairs, es-
pecially the department responsible for
grassroots reconstruction at provincial and
county levels and amongst intellectuals.
In arguing their case, they highlighted the
benefits of competitive elections. These in-
cluded the idea that leaders chosen by the vil-
lagers rather than appointed from above by the
township and county governments would find
it easier to govern village affairs. In particular,
they would have more success in persuading
villagers to comply with directives from above
such as family planning quotas, grain procu-
rement, tax collection, and requests for volun-
tary labour. Participation in elections would
increase farmers’ interests in collective affairs
and so counter both the atomising tendencies
stimulated by the “household responsibility
system” as well as the channelling of grie-
vances into rural protest [Kelliher 1997; Liu
2000; Li 2001; O’Brien 2002; Unger 2002].
Moreover, the process of elections would
not only provide a mechanism for villagers to
oust unpopular, incompetent and corrupt lea-
ders but also a way to rejuvenate and rele-
gitimise the Party in rural areas. Though
introducing a democratic system was not the
prime motive of many government proponents
of the elections, Party and government offi-
cials3 were well aware that competitive vil-
lage elections could be used to demonstrate to
the outside world, and in particular the West,
that China was becoming democratic in its
own way.
Those opposed to the idea of competitive
village elections were concerned that this
would lead to “chaos” for several reasons.
Some suggested that villagers would not be
able to make the right choices about their lea-
ders and were not sufficiently educated for de-
mocracy, a view that implicitly expressed an
inherent distrust and disrespect of villagers.
Others feared that competitive elections could
lead to demands for similar processes at
township, county and provincial levels, or even
3. Proponents of village elections tended to emphasise
the goals of democratic village elections as being about
economic development, regime legitimacy and social
stability. For further details, see J. Howell [1998].
. . .
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higher, which ultimately might threaten the
status of the CCP. Many township officials in
particular were opposed to the elections as
these would reduce their power to appoint vil-
lage leaders and potentially make their task of
implementing Party and government directives
in villages much harder. Others were con-
cerned that in some parts of China competitive
elections would lead to the revitalisation of cla-
nism and thus intensify conflict along clan
lines both within and between villages.
Despite these concerns, the idea of demo-
cratic competitive village elections in China is
now firmly rooted. By 2006, all provinces in
China had held at least one round of village
elections, with some provinces such as Fujian
already undergoing their sixth round of elec-
tions. Numerous investigations suggest that the
newly-elected village leaders are younger,
more entrepreneurial and more educated than
their predecessors. The profiles of the new lea-
ders are in part informed also by the require-
ments for candidacy put forward by the
Ministry of Civil Affairs, which amongst other
things stipulate that candidates should be under
45. Not all are Party members4 but it is to be
noted that the Party is quick to absorb these new
leaders into their fold, thereby relegitimising
itself at grassroots level.
There remains considerable variation in
how elections are conducted, such as whether
or not they hold secret ballots, how these are
implemented, how votes of absent migrant
workers or proxy voting is carried out [Kaye
1995; Elklit 1997; Howell 1998; Alpermann
2001].5 There are also reports of malpractices
such as vote-buying, clanism, fraud, and
township officials interfering in election
processes to ensure their favoured candidate
secures a leadership position, and on occasions
even subverting the decisions of villagers.
As village elections have become more ins-
titutionalised, officials from the Department of
Construction of Grassroots Government and
Community under the Ministry of Civil Affairs
have begun to focus not only on systematising
and standardising processes of election, but
also on post-election issues such as transpa-
rency of village budgets, the functioning of vil-
lage assemblies, and the relationship between
village committees and Party branches. Since
the late 1980s, there have also been experi-
ments with introducing competitive elections
at township level, Shenzhen and Suining both
being cases in point [Shi 2000; Li 2002a; Ja-
kobson 2004]. In some villages, elections have
also been introduced to select the Party branch
secretary [Li 1999].
China has now experienced over two de-
cades of competitive elections. Though they
have brought some stability to rural gover-
nance, the continuing waves of rural protests
around issues such as land sales, pollution and
corruption suggest that the situation in some
rural areas is still quite fragile. Moreover, the
limited experimentation with elections at
4. For example, in 1996 the Ministry of Civil Affairs
reported that around 40% of village committee chairs
were not Party members [Howell 1998].
5. “Election Observation Report,” Fujian, IRI (Interna-
tional Republican Institute), May 1997. See also K. Chen,
“Chinese Villages Get Taste of Democracy,” The Wall
Street Journal (May 17th, 1995) and S. Mufson, “China
Dabbles in Democracy to Run Villages’ Reform Party”,




higher levels indicates that the process of po-
litical reform remains tightly controlled by the
central Party leaders. For some external resear-
chers and observers the democratic content and
purpose of the village elections remains highly
dubious. However, it might also be argued that
despite the distortions and weaknesses of the
electoral processes, the elections have contri-
buted to the development of a rights and de-
mocratic consciousness amongst villagers,
leading to expectations of accountability and
the right to choose one’s leaders.
There is now a considerable body of re-
search on China’s village elections. Much of
this examines the processes of elections in par-
ticular villages and counties. Key themes in-
vestigated include actual electoral practices
[Elklit 1997; Howell 1998; Manion 2000; Bai
and Zhao 2001; Cai ed. 2002]; legal cases
taken by villagers against higher levels of go-
vernment [Li 2002b]; township and village re-
lations [Howell 1998; Jin and Shi 2002; Tong
2002]; practices of budget transparency, cla-
nism [Xiao ed. 2002] and analysis of village
assemblies [Wang et al. 1994].
What is startling, however, is the virtual ab-
sence of any research on the gender dimensions
of village elections and village governance. Not
even the EU research programme has sponsored
any major work in this area, despite the inclu-
sion in the original agreement that gender as-
pects should be investigated.6 There is a paucity
of systematic research on the gender dynamics
of village elections and village governance.7
This is particularly alarming given that only 1%
of village chairs is a woman, according to the
most recent statistics, and that most village
committees have no more than 1 female
member, out of 3 to 9 members. In the next
section we explore further the underrepresen-
tation of women in village committees and sug-
gest that this phenomenon is part of a broader
pattern of political participation in China.
The Gendered Nature of Politics
Statistics on village elections are highly
uneven and not wholly reliable. This is in part
because the Ministry of Civil Affairs has not
had in place a comprehensive system for col-
lecting and analysing data, in part because of
the sheer volume of data to be collected in a
country as large as China, and in part because
the Ministry depends on information that is fed
up the chain. Figures on the gender aspects of
village elections and governance such as the
numbers of women and women on village
committees, in the village assemblies, or in
Party branches are even more uneven. Not all
provincial and county-level authorities have
collected data disaggregated for gender and
even where they have, the data may not cover
all village governance institutions nor an
extended period of time.
Our research on female political participa-
tion in village committees in three provinces
of China reveals a number of patterns that are
6. In 2005, however, it funded one research project led
by Xiao Bailing on women’s political participation in
village governance in Hunan province. In contrast, the
Ford Foundation has provided support for a number of
research projects on female political participation in vil-
lage committees whilst the Asia Foundation has run a
specific programme on female political participation.
7. Current writings on rural female political participation
include Fan Yu [2000] and Yang Shanhua [2003].
. . .
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also replicated at the higher levels of the po-
litical system. These patterns are, first, the nu-
merical underrepresentation of women in
political positions at all levels; second, the oc-
cupation by women of deputy rather than chief
positions; and, third, the assignment to women
of portfolios that relate to their reproductive
and domestic roles. We explore each of these
emerging patterns in turn.
First, women are numerically underrepre-
sented in formal politics at all levels in China.
Available statistics suggest that only 1% of vil-
lage chairs are women, that 16% of village
committee members are women, and that the
numbers of women on village committees ra-
rely exceeds 1 [Fan 2000].8 Moreover, there
are villages that have no female representation
on village committees. In one town in Hunan
province, for example, only 2 out of the 38
village committees had more than 1 woman on
the committee. In city X, in Shandong pro-
vince, the percentage of Party branches and
village committees with female members fell
to 62% after the introduction of competitive
village elections in 1999. Following subse-
quent initiatives by the local department of
Civil Affairs, the Party’s Organisational Bu-
reau and the Women’s Federation, this had in-
creased by 2003 to 90% of all villages.
However, women still remained in a minority
on village committees. In 1998, for example,
women made up 11% of the total membership
of local Party branches and village commit-
tees. This rose to 18% in 2003. Only 100 vil-
lages out of a total of 3,753, that is 3.7%, had
female village heads or Party branch heads.
Similarly, in county-level city A under city X
in Shandong province, there were only 8
female Party branch heads, that is 1.3%, and
2 female village heads, that is 0.3%, in a total
of 607 villages. In township A under city Y,
there was only 1 female Party branch head in
27 villages and no female village head. In the
three villages we investigated under township
B, women accounted for just 8% of all Party
members.9 There were only 8 female Party
members out of a total of 98 in the village,
amounting to only 8%.
This numerical underrepresentation of
women in political positions is not unique to
villages or to rural areas or to village commit-
tees. In city X in Shandong province, only 2
out of 9 vice-mayors in 2003 were women.
Only 1 woman sat on the city Party Committee,
which had a total of 13 members. In the capital
city of Hunan province, only 1 out of 6 vice-
mayors was a woman in 2003, accounting for
16.6%. In county A, Hunan province, only 2
female town and township governors out of a
total of 35 were female, a mere 6%. Of the
over 58,600 Party members in the county, 10%
were women. In another county in Hunan pro-
vince, women made up 10% of township go-
vernors, that is 3 out of 21, and 3% of Party
secretaries, that is 1 out of 21.
At the national level, women are numeri-
cally underrepresented in all Party and govern-
ment organs. For example, there has not been
a single woman in the Chinese Politburo
8. This situation pertains also as of 2006 (personal
communication).
9. In village A, 8 out of 98 Party members were women
(8%); in village B, 5 out of 62 Party members were




Standing Committee since the late 1980s10 and
there is only 1 woman in the Political Bureau,
namely, Wu Yi, out of a total of 24 members.11
Amongst the alternate members of the Central
Committee as of 2006, women made up only
14%, 22 out of a total of 156 delegates.12 Wi-
thin the CCP women constitute a minority. As
of May 2005, there were 12.96 million female
members, making up 18.6% of all members.13
Since 1949, there have been only 2 female
provincial governors, namely, Gu Xiulian,
who became governor of Jiangsu province in
1983, and Song Xiuyan, who became governor
of Qinghai province in 200.14 There are no fe-
male ministers in the current leadership. Only
1 out of 4 vice-premiers is female, namely, Wu
Yi, and only 1 out of 5 state councillors is a
woman, namely Chen Zhili. Women account
for 20% of the Tenth National People’s
Congress (NPC) delegates, 1.5% less than in
the 9th People’s Congress. Moreover, the
number of delegates to the NPC has never re-
gained its peak of 22.6% in the 4th NPC in
1975, nor have women since achieved 25% re-
presentation on the NPC Standing Committee.
Of the 120 members of the CCP Central
Commission for Discipline Inspection, only
14, that is 11.6%, are women.15
Second, women in China face a bamboo
ceiling at all levels of the government and
Party hierarchies. Men occupy the highest po-
sitions of power and authority, whilst women
can aspire at the most to deputy offices. So
women tend to be vice-mayors rather than
mayor, deputy ministers rather than minister,
deputy governors rather than governor, deputy
section heads rather than section head and so
on. For example, there has never been a female
General Secretary or female President of
China. Nearly all provincial governors in
China, bar one, are, as of 2006, male. Simi-
larly, most township and county governors are
male, with women occupying usually only one
of several vice-positions. For example, in
Changsha in Hunan province women account
for 1 of 6 vice-mayors, i.e. 17%. In a county
below this city, 2 out of 35 town and township
governors are women, i.e. approximately 6%.
In city B in this province, 1 out of 4 vice-
governors is a woman and the same proportion
recurs in a town under this city’s jurisdiction.
Women account for only 500 out of all 5,000
mayors and vice-mayors in China’s cities and
counties, i.e. less than 10%, and 9 out of 10
mayors are male.16
The third gendered pattern of political parti-
cipation that emerges from the research is that
women tend to be assigned portfolios of work
that mirror their reproductive and domestic
10. The last woman to serve in the Politburo Standing
Committee was Jiang Qing, Mao’s second wife, during
the height of the Cultural Revolution.
11. See www.china.org.cn.
12. Idem.
13. “Chinese Communist Party Says Membership Rea-




16. “500 Women Mayors in China’s 661 cities,”
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roles. For example, at village level, nearly all
women with positions on the village committee
will be allocated the tasks of family planning
and/or women’s work. If no woman is elected
on to the village committee, then often she will
be coopted on as the committee feels it needs a
woman to undertake those tasks.
Of the women leaders we interviewed in
our fieldwork, all of them were given respon-
sibility for family planning and women’s
work. Some were additionally assigned tasks
such as mediation, which involves sorting out
disputes in the villages, an activity which
women are seen to be more adept at. So the
gendered interpretation of certain tasks such
as family planning and by its very name
“women’s work” leads to women always
being given these responsibilities at the ex-
pense of other work such as village economic
development which is not viewed as essential
to their sex.
Moreover, the status of women’s work is
not high. In this respect, it was noteworthy that
in two of the villages under investigation in
Shandong province, the Party Secretaries re-
ported initially only half the number of village
group heads until corrected by a higher-level
cadre of the Women’s Federation that the
heads of the women’s committees in each
village group were also group leaders.
This gendered division of public assign-
ments reflects a longer history in which women
have been allotted roles in public life that relate
specifically to women and children. For
example, Long March veterans such as Cai
Chang, Kang Keqing and Deng Ying Chao
were assigned portfolios after Liberation in the
area of women and children, rather than
defence, economy or transport. Having out-
lined these three key patterns of political parti-
cipation, we proceed in the next section to
explore the barriers that impede women from
achieving positions in formal politics.
Barriers to Women’s Political Participation
Given the CCP’s long commitment to women’s
emancipation, it seems paradoxical that women
continue to be underrepresented in government
and Party structures and in village governance
institutions. The CCP has propagated a gender
ideology that abhors the oppression of women. It
acted swiftly after Liberation in 1949 to ban prac-
tices such as child marriage, bigamy, foot-bin-
ding, which it castigated as feudal and oppressive
to women, to facilitate divorce and to enhance the
possibilities for women to participate in the
waged economy [Davin 1976; Andors 1983;
Croll 1983]. Why is it then that at the turn of the
millennium women continue to be underrepre-
sented in political and administrative structures?
In trying to understand the multiple causes
underpinning women’s numerical representa-
tion in politics, gender theorists such as
Vicky Randall [1987], Joni Lovenduski and
Vicky Randall [1993], Dorothy Stetson and
Amy G. Mazur [1995] point to a number of
factors that constrain women’s participation
in politics. These include structural factors
such as the lower wages of women in capi-
talist economies, the lack of childcare facili-
ties, and the division of labour in the
household and economy; gender socialisation
which shapes the role of women and men
respectively in public life; institutional varia-
bles such as recruitment and promotion sys-




norms associated with political leadership;
and sexual discrimination.
The All-China Women’s Federation, Party/
government leaders, and many scholars in
China commonly attribute the numerical under-
representation of women in political positions
to a combination of these factors. The dominant
refrain gives particular salience to the persis-
tence of a “feudal ideology” that portrays
women as inferior to men; to the double burden
of having to balance family responsibilities
with waged work; and to women’s own lack of
self-confidence and “low quality,” which sup-
posedly hinder women from putting themselves
forward for positions of authority. This is neatly
summarised in the words of a senior leader in
Tianjin Women’s Federation who explained in
an interview in the winter of 2000:
First, women don’t come forward; se-
cond, their educational quality is low; and
third, men don’t want to be led by women.
Moreover, the problem is typically unders-
tood to pertain more to rural rather than urban
areas, and therefore is associated with back-
wardness, illiteracy, and a general lack of
formal education. In this section, we demons-
trate that whilst these factors do contribute to-
wards the numerical underrepresentation of
women in formal politics, there are also other
compounding variables of an institutional,
ideological and cultural nature which intervene
to keep women out of politics.
At the ideological level, the growing ten-
sions between competing gender ideologies
along with the superstructural nature of state
interventions around women in politics contri-
bute paradoxically towards the continuing
underrepresentation of women in rural formal
politics. The gender ideology of the CCP, and
hence the All-China Women’s Federation,
draws upon an analysis of gender oppression
rooted in the Marxist and Maoist traditions.
Women’s subjugation is crucially linked to
their subordination in the production process.
After 1949, the Party mobilised women into
the waged economy not only for purposes of
hastening economic reconstruction but also for
ideological reasons of gender equality. Reco-
gnising that beliefs about women’s essential
inferiority continued to exist despite structural
changes in the economy, Mao placed increa-
sing emphasis on promoting gender equality
through ideological means. This reached its
zenith during the Cultural Revolution when
women were called upon to undertake tasks
previously done only by men such as steel-
workers or physical work in the oil-fields of
Da Qing.17
With the advent of reforms from 1978 on-
wards, however, the images, slogans and texts
used to mobilise women have had to compete
with new gender ideologies introduced
through the processes of marketisation, glo-
balisation and commoditisation, which in turn
reflect fundamental shifts in the economic
structure of China. These structural changes
in China’s economy have altered women’s
position in the economy, leading to new
demands, interests and needs. With the
17. Nevertheless, subsequent research has revealed per-
sisting disparities in remuneration between men and
women in the communes and the reproduction of gender
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widespread adoption of the “household res-
ponsibility system,” women were once again
propelled back into the confines of the hou-
sehold. With the breakdown of collective pro-
duction and health systems, the decline in
provision of child-care facilities, and the mi-
gration of men and younger women to the ci-
ties, the bulk of agricultural production as
well as domestic responsibilities such as ca-
ring for the elderly, children and sick have
fallen increasingly and unequally on women.
In trying to persuade women to engage in
formal politics, the All-China Women’s Fede-
ration has focussed its attention on individual
women. In particular, campaigns such as the
“Four Selfs,” which seek to boost women’s
self-confidence and the perceived “low qua-
lity” of women, or training campaigns such as
“Double Study, Double Competition,” aimed
at improving women’s technical capacity,
tackle the issue of gender subordination from
a superstructural standpoint. They serve as a
counter-ideology to the conservatism that fuels
the circulation of phrases that cast women in
the household and women as weak. However,
by targeting only women, they neither chal-
lenge the sexist attitudes of men nor address
the structural factors that constrain women’s
participation in politics.
Local government and Party cadres we in-
terviewed frequently referred to the low qua-
lity of women as a reason both explaining why
women did not put themselves forward for
elected political positions and, if they did, were
not elected. When asked why women did not
wish to be elected to the village committees,
the Chair of the Women’s Federation in town
A under city B in Hunan province replied:
Women’s status is not high. Women have
a lower salary than men. Women’s qua-
lity is lower than that of men. Their abili-
ties are limited because their education is
low and women don’t seize opportunities.
The disjuncture between official gender
ideology, the actually lived realities of increa-
singly diverse groups of women, the focus of
interventions on changing attitudes, mainly of
women, diverts attention away from an ana-
lysis of the other factors shaping women’s po-
sitioning in formal politics, such as economic
structures, provision of child-care arrange-
ments, institutional barriers and the culture of
politics in China. In a nutshell, the way the
problem is construed and the subsequent me-
thods for resolving it contribute ironically to
the perpetuation of gendered imbalances in the
political system.
The institutional barriers to female political
participation in village committees and indeed
at all levels of the Party/state system are ma-
nifold. These range from the very language
used in the relevant legislation to promote
women in village elections to the continued
importance of Party membership in achieving
positions of authority.
In order to ensure gender equality in the
village committees, Article 9 in both the tem-
porary and permanent Village Organic Laws
of 1988 and 1998 stipulated that village
committees were required to have an “appro-
priate portion of women” on the village
committees. Indirectly confirming that this
was rarely achieved, the Ministry of Civil
Affairs in 1999 circulated a document en-
titled “Suggestions for the Guarantee of a




Committees.” The vagueness of this language
hindered the implementation of the law as pro-
vincial, county, and township authorities were
not required to ensure either that all villages
had equal numbers of male and female repre-
sentatives or that a majority of villages under
their jurisdiction had equal representation.
More progressive provincial governments
such as Hunan and Shandong introduced local
regulations in 2002, which stated that the cen-
tral legislation was to be interpreted to mean
that “at least 1 woman” should be on the vil-
lage committee.18 City X in Shandong province
carried out some action research to understand
why villagers had not voted for women in the
first round of competitive village elections in
1999.19 On the basis of their findings, they put
forward a suggestion to the Party Committee
that all village committees should have at least
1 female member. This proposal was approved
in Document 18 issued by the Party Committee
in October 2003.20
However, the effects of this local regulation
have been double-edged. On the one hand, they
have drawn attention to the gendered nature of
village elections and pushed provincial,
county, township and village leaders to ensure
that the numerical representation of women on
village committees improve. On the other
hand, the call for a minimum of 1 woman has
been conveniently reinterpreted as a maximum
of 1. In all three provinces of Hunan, Shan-
dong and Jilin where we conducted research,
most village committees had only 1 female
member. For example, in Xiangxi Prefecture
in Hunan province, only 1 out of 10 villages
had more than 1 woman on the village
committee (check for Jilin and Shandong).
Even where the woman is head of the village
committee, she will still often be the only
woman on the committee.
The electoral organising committees at
township and county levels frequently stipu-
late criteria for selecting candidates such as
minimum and maximum ages of 18 and 45
years, respectively,21 educational levels of at
least lower secondary school, evidence of ca-
pability such as the economic success of the
household and good moral behaviour, as re-
flected in compliance with the family planning
18. For further details see Document 16, issued by
Hunan Province Civil Affairs Bureau and Women’s Fe-
deration in 2001, “Guanyu cai cunminhui huanbie zhong
baozheng cunweihui banzi zhong you shidang nuxing
cengyuan de yijian” (Suggestions on Protecting an Ap-
propriate Number of Female Members on Village
Committees in the Elections for Village Committees).
19. The Women’s Federation of city X in Shandong pro-
vince carried out a questionnaire survey of 1,000 people
in 16 (out of 86) towns and townships. Their key findings
were, first, that many cadres did not know about Article
9 of the Village Organic Law, which required there be
“an appropriate proportion of women” on village
committees; second, that they interpreted this as a soft
condition, meaning that “there should be” rather than
“there must best be at least 1 woman.” (Interview,
Women’s Federation, city X, Shandong, April 2003)
20. In an article in China Daily (see footnote 1), it
is reported that Henan and Gansu provinces and Ti-
betan Autonomous Region have also amended local
laws to guarantee that at least 1 woman sits on the
village committees.
21. In some villages, the age limit is even lower. For
example, in town B under city B in Hunan province, the
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policy. However, such criteria can work
against women because of gendered imba-
lances in educational opportunities for girls
and boys, the effects of decollectivisation and
the gendered domestic division of labour. In
one village in town B under city B in Hunan
province, where there was, at the time of in-
terview, no female member of the village
committee, the local accountant explained:
Women were not up to standard as they
usually had not attained lower secondary
school level.
The cultural practices of son-preference and
virilocal marriage translate materially into boys
being given favoured access to schooling, espe-
cially in poorer families and rural areas. The mea-
surement of capability in terms of economic
success can also work against women. In many
parts of China, women have assumed prime res-
ponsibility for agriculture whilst the men engage
more in more profitable off-farm activities. The
structural positioning of rural women in less
well-renumerated jobs such as farming and ca-
ring makes it then harder for them to demonstrate
their capacities to other villagers.
This in turn is compounded by engrained
cultural prejudices about the mobility and
hence life experiences of men and women that
are neatly captured in phrases such as
“nanwai, nunei” (men outside, women in-
side).22 This phrase portrays men as going out
into the public world and therefore being more
worldly-wise and knowledgeable, whilst
women remain confined in the private space
of the household and therefore tend to be more
narrow in outlook and unworldly. The parti-
cular profiling of candidates encouraged by
these criteria, which draw upon cultural depo-
sits of enduring gendered attitudes, tend, thus,
to favour the selection of male candidates.
The criteria recommended for village
committee candidates also stipulate age limits.
With an upper age limit of 45, women have
less chance of standing for election or for see-
king promotion in Party/government systems
because of the cycle of caring responsibilities
that fall mainly on women. In their early twen-
ties and thirties, women in rural areas become
the primary carers for their children. As village
leaders, they would be required to travel to the
township and sometimes county authorities to
resolve various village issues. With young
children to care for, such extensive travel
would put considerable pressures on women to
balance the demands of work with those of the
household. By their forties, they are often ha-
ving to care for elderly in-laws, again leaving
them less time to gain experience in village
affairs, to develop relevant organisational and
management skills, and to build up networks
of support.
The lack of clarity and unevenness in vil-
lage election procedures, particularly the no-
mination and selection processes, also create
scope for male bias to intervene in selection
processes. There is considerable variation
across China in how candidates are nominated.
Some villages adopt what is called the “sea
elections method,” whereby villagers put
22. The vice-chair of the Women’s Federation in city X
in Shandong province also referred to the refrain of
“women are weak, men are strong” (nu zhi ruo, nan zhi
qiang) as shaping the way some men view women and




forward any number of names in a public mee-
ting. In other villages, village groups or the
heads of households nominate candidates. In
the villages surveyed, most heads of village
groups were male and the heads of households
called as representatives to the village group
were also predominantly male.
In effect, with the “village group or house-
hold method” the initial nomination of
candidates was effectively done by men.
Furthermore, in the next stage of whittling
down the number of candidates to one more
than the number of vacant positions, the pro-
cess is again led almost entirely by men, who
constitute the majority in the village election
committees, village groups and representa-
tives. In village A of township B, Shandong
province, the village election committee in-
cluded 5 village group heads, elected from a
total of 8, all of whom were male.
Male domination of key village organisa-
tions reflects a broader pattern at all levels of
the Party/government system. Though Party
membership is not a requisite for standing as
a candidate in village committee elections,
most leading positions at all levels of the state
hierarchy are occupied by Party members. The
fusion of the Party/government and at village
level of the Party branch and village
committee23 as well as the greater salience of
Party over government or village committee
leaders make it even more important that
women’s representation in the Party increases.
Indeed Alpermann [2001: 46] argues that the
village committees and the Party branch are
best treated as “one leadership group.” After
the elections, new village committee chairs are
frequently courted by Party authorities to
become members as a way of rejuvenating and
relegitimising the Party.
However, women continue to be underrepre-
sented in the CCP.24 As of 2005, only 18.6% of
all Party members were women.25 In rural areas,
the institution of virilocal marriage makes it
much harder for women to become involved in
Party activities. Local Party members are reluc-
tant to invest time and energy in young women,
who will leave their villages upon marriage.
Once installed in the village of their husband,
young women lack the networks which their
male counterparts have developed during child-
hood and schooling. Furthermore, land reform
has led in some villages to the denial of village
residence status to women marrying into the
village and hence of their rights to participate in
village politics.26 Thus, women’s underrepre-
sentation in the Party coupled with the gendered
networks that cement together different village
organisations present women with considerable
barriers in the election process.
23. For example, in one village under township A in city
Y in Shandong province, the village committee and Party
branch operate effectively as one organisation, with 3 out
of the 9 members serving on both organisations.
24. This stands in contrast to other parties where the
proportion of female members is higher. For example,
47% of members of the Chinese Peasants and Workers’
Democratic Party were female as of 2001, compared to
around 15% of CCP members.
25. See footnote 13.
26. B. Alpermann [2003: 13] suggests that this occurs
particularly in richer villages which can afford to provide
collective welfare and in land-poor villages which do not
want to distribute land to women marrying into the village.
. . .
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The way in which women are located in
leading Party/government positions in rural
areas and rewarded for their work is also
shaped by deeply gendered promotion and job
assignment practices. As discussed in the pre-
vious section, not only are there fewer women
in leadership positions in villages than men,
but they are nearly always allotted responsibi-
lity for family planning and women’s work,
tasks that would rarely be assigned to men. If
women are seen to have political leadership
skills, then they are quickly channelled into
women’s work or family planning rather than
into more mainstream positions in the village.
For example, a female village committee
chair we interviewed in Jilin province re-
counted how she had at various times served
as head of family planning, leading cadre of
the women’s federation in the village, deputy
Party secretary and village committee chair.
As village committee chair she also continued
her responsibilities as head of family planning
and the women’s federation, tasks which male
chairs had not previously undertaken.
This mirrors a similar trend at higher levels
of the state hierarchy where women leaders in
government are often transferred into or pro-
moted via the Women’s Federation rather than
through other government sectors. For
example, the female head of city B’s Women’s
Federation in Hunan province had progressed
from being a township governor to township
Party secretary and finally to her higher posi-
tion in the city B. Where they are promoted
within local government structures, they enter
a male-dominated work environment that
makes few allowances for the higher domestic
burden that female cadres face. In an interview,
a vice-Party secretary of a township in county
B, Hunan province, who had also worked pre-
viously in the Women’s Federation, expressed
her frustration at the lack of arrangements for
female cadres with domestic responsibilities:
Women’s status is not high. Higher levels
require lower levels to have women ca-
dres but, for myself, I am not pleased
about being promoted because of the fa-
mily burden and there is a lot of work at
township level.
Similarly, the head of township B’s
Women’s Federation under city B in Hunan
province expressed her frustration with the
sexist attitudes of male cadres, which favoured
the promotion of men over women. She
complained how she had scored significantly
higher in a test than a male cadre but the latter
was transferred to the more wealthy township.
As she put it:
They didn’t want a woman with higher
secondary school education. They look
down on women.
Furthermore, she recounted how after ta-
king up the position in township B, her boss
put her under pressure not to take the full fix
months’ maternity leave. When she refused to
cut short her maternity leave, his reply was:
That’s why we don’t want women.
Though the channelling of village women
with leadership potential into family planning
and women’s work clearly develops a range of
transferable skills, it also precludes them from
developing a broader portfolio of experience




transport, infrastructural work, areas that
would give them greater credibility in the eyes
of village voters.
Moreover, family planning policy has
been deeply unpopular in rural areas so that
women leaders become associated with the
coercive rather than developmental dimen-
sions of state authority. If no women have
been elected to village committees, the vil-
lage head will often coopt the head of family
planning or of the women’s committee onto
the committee. For example, in one village in
town C under city B in Hunan province, the
local officials explained that if no women
were elected onto the village committee, then
village Party branch, village committee and
village group representatives recommend 1
woman, for whom there is then a supplemen-
tary election. This woman then becomes the
head of the women’s committee and is added
on to the village committee. When trying to
elicit the precise number of village com-
mittee members, this situation often led to
some confusion among interviewees as the
status of such cooptees on the committee was
not entirely clear.
Women leaders responsible for women’s
work are less well rewarded compared to both
family planning cadres and to other village
committee members, often receiving little or
no remuneration for their work. This is often
justified on the grounds that the head of the
women’s committee is not a “main cadre” (zhu
ganbu) compared to other village committee
members such as the Party secretary, accoun-
tant, secretary or family planning head.27 Both
family planning and women’s work cadres en-
counter institutional discrimination in the
provision of pensions, which relates in turn to
their relatively low status in the state hierarchy.
Only key people in the village committee
and Party branch, such as the village head,
Party secretary and accountant, are entitled to a
pension after twenty years of service. Yet,
heads of village women’s committees fre-
quently perform these duties for similarly ex-
tended periods of time. The devaluing of
women’s contribution is reflected also in the
failure to implement policies requiring that
grassroots women cadres should be treated in
the same way as section-level cadres after eight
years of work and three years of assessment. In
order to address this, Hunan provincial govern-
ment reissued in March 2002 a circular dating
back to 1989 that stipulated this provision.
Finally, the culture of politics is, as in most
countries, highly gendered, serving as an obs-
tacle to women both getting into and remai-
ning in politics. Smoking, heavy drinking and
toasting at meals are part and parcel of main-
taining relations with colleagues and with
higher-level authorities in China. However,
women are also not well regarded if they are
seen to smoke or drink heavily in public.
Thus, the cultural practices that bond rela-
tionships of trust and solidarity between men
have ambiguous implications for women. Fe-
male leaders both in villages and at higher le-
vels face the dilemma of whether to participate
in such practices or not. If they do, they may
be seen as women of ill-repute; if they do not,
then they may be seen as arrogant and above
27. This was the case in a village we visited in Feng
Huang county, Hunan province.
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“the masses.” Furthermore, norms around in-
teraction between men and women can also
render it difficult for women to take on lea-
dership positions in villages. Illustrating this,
one young female village head in Hunan pro-
vince recounted how she had to be careful
not to be seen alone with a man; otherwise
villagers would gossip.
Room for Optimism
Whilst we have outlined here some of the bar-
riers to female political participation, there are
also a number of factors that could positively
promote women’s engagement in politics.
First, despite the persistence of gendered
cultural norms, the Party still promotes a
gender ideology advocating gender equality
and it has at hand a well-established women’s
machinery to advocate on behalf of women.
Despite the challenges it faces from competing
ideologies, the official gender ideology is still
a resource that advocates of greater women’s
political participation can draw upon to bolster
their arguments. Activists within the Party/
state system who are pushing for the introduc-
tion of quotas for women can, and do, make
ample use of the Party ideology to persuade and
cajole Party leaders to move on this issue. Fur-
thermore, the ranking of China in international
leagues comparing female political participa-
tion, such as the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s
League Table, does matter to the CCP as does
the democratic display of village elections.
However, for this ideology to be more effec-
tive, it needs to be underpinned by a serious
analysis of the structural foundations of
women’s subordination in the contemporary re-
form context. In particular, the notion that
women require the protection of the state needs
to be challenged. Such a notion rests on the idea
that women are biologically weaker than men.
This biological account of gendered differences
fuels a more popular discourse that women are
weak and therefore less capable than men, an
idea that can readily be appropriated in certain
circumstances by more conservative forces to
keep women in the home and out of politics and
indeed the waged economy.
Second, unlike many other countries, China
has a long-standing Women’s Federation,
which can use and has used its position within
the Party and connections with high-level lea-
ders as an entry-point to advance women’s po-
litical representation. In the last three years,
representatives from the All-China Women’s
Federation and the Ministry of Civil Affairs
have collaborated actively to promote women
standing as candidates for village committee
positions. Such collaboration across ministries
and with the Party can be effective in bringing
about change at lower levels. Indeed, during
the politically turbulent days of the Cultural
Revolution women’s activism and political
participation reached its highest level in the
post-Liberation history of China. In particular,
the new revolutionary committees created op-
portunities for women to enter politics, as illus-
trated by the case of Shanghai where women
made up 22% of these committees in 1973.28
The All-China Women’s Federation has or-
ganised a number of training sessions to en-
courage women to stand for positions such as
28. In some areas, women made up half of all cadres at




village chair. Part of this process has involved
instituting elections for village women’s
committees. In the past, women leaders were
appointed to these positions by the village head
or township authorities. Many have held these
positions for long periods. In order to rejuve-
nate the leadership of women’s work in vil-
lages and involve more dynamic and
enthusiastic women, the Women’s Federation
has skilfully adopted the election method.
Given that this is the dominant route whereby
women enter village politics, for the reasons
discussed above, cultivating women leaders
who could take on a larger role in the village
is one way to boost the participation of women
in village politics.
For example, the Women’s Federation in
city X in Shandong province responded to the
decline in the representation of women in vil-
lage committees by pushing through a docu-
ment calling for there to be at least 1 woman on
every village committee, by engaging the Party,
media, Civil Affairs Bureau and other institu-
tions to promote the participation of women in
the 2001 elections and by bolstering training for
the heads of women’s committees to stand as
candidates on the village committees. As indi-
cated earlier, they managed to increase the
number of village committees with women on
them from 62% in 1999 to 88% in 2003.29
The city Party Committee similarly has been
trying to encourage more women to join the
Party, introducing a requirement in 2002 that
25% of all new members and at least 15% of all
Party committee representatives should be fe-
male. As a result, the percentage of women be-
longing to the Party rose from 10% in 1998 to
13% in 2003 and, as of 2003, 16% of all Party
committee representatives were women. Ho-
wever, as discussed in section two, whilst tar-
gets can increase the numerical representation
of women in politics, they can also prove to be a
bamboo ceiling for women, unless concomitant
action is taken to address the underlying insti-
tutional, political and economic causes of
women’s subordination.
Apart from these special training sessions,
the All-China Women’s Federation assisted
the Ministry of Civil Affairs in developing the
“Guidebook on Women’s Participation in Vil-
lagers’ Self-Governance” in August 2003. This
is the first such guide aimed at promoting
women in rural politics and providing practical
tools and tips on how to get elected into power.
In the summer of 2004, the Ministry of
Civil Affairs along with the Women’s Re-
search Institute organised a seminar on
women’s political participation involving aca-
demics, female village committee heads, dele-
gates from the National People’s Congress and
cadres from national and provincial levels of
the Women’s Federation to discuss how to ad-
vance women in political leadership positions.
At this workshop a proposal was put forward
that quotas for women should be introduced,
as had been done in villages in India, and that
the 1998 Organic Law should be amended ac-
cordingly. Since then, a revised draft of the
Organic Law has been drawn up that states that
there be at least 1 woman on the village
29. Reflective of this push from above, the number of
village committees with a female member rose in
township B in Shandong province from 10 out of 27 in
1996 to 26 out of 27 by 2004. However, only 1 of these
villages had a female Party secretary.
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committee. If this revision is approved at the
next National People’s Congress in 2007, then
we can expect there to be a substantial increase
in the number of village committees with
female representatives.
All this suggests that there are progressive
women within the Party/state who are using
their positions to advance women’s political
participation through policy and legislative
change. In the end, of course, it is the imple-
mentation of new regulations and policies that
will determine how much changes in practice.
Finally, over the last two decades over 180
million rural workers have migrated to urban
areas in search of employment and higher wages,
many of whom are women. In some sectors such
as textiles, electronics, hotel and catering, rural
women account for the majority of workers. The
experiences of living far away from home in an
urban context is often path-changing for many
rural women. They become exposed to different
ways of life and to the global media, thus broade-
ning their horizons and also raising their aspira-
tions. Most remit substantial sums of money to
their families in the villages, which can be used
for schooling younger family members, renova-
ting houses, investing in new machinery or
setting up sideline businesses.
The new-found incomes of such women can
bolster their status back in the villages, under-
mining some of the economic conditions in-
fluencing women’s participation. For those that
return to their villages, they bring with them a
wealth of experience, self-confidence, kno-
wledge and an ability to engage with a wide
range of people. As knowledge of the wider
world is seen as an important condition for po-
litical leadership in the village elections as well
as the ability to generate income, then rural
migrant women are as well-placed as their male
counterparts to stand as candidates in village
elections. Their experience outside challenges
the idea that women lack knowledge of worldly
affairs or understanding of local authorities that
is commonly rehearsed to excuse the failure to
nominate more female candidates.
Clearly the positive effects of migration on
gendered attitudes towards women taking up
leadership positions in villages will take time
to weave their course. Nevertheless, a process
has been set in train that could potentially un-
settle engrained sexist norms and attitudes in
a more deep-cutting way than the exhausted
method of ideological mobilisation.
Conclusion
Competitive village elections in China have
drawn considerable attention from researchers
in China and abroad. For some, they create an
opening for greater democracy in China. Even
if the idea of competitive, multi-candidate elec-
tions is not extended up the hierarchy, the prac-
tice of overturning leaders, of selecting
candidates and the rhetoric of “democratic
elections” creates expectations amongst a po-
pulation that is increasingly exposed to worlds
beyond China’s borders. Others, however,
views these elections as a farce, deliberately
instituted by the Party to dupe international ob-
servers into believing that China is becoming
less authoritarian and more democratic. Wha-
tever position is taken on village elections, it is
curious that little mention is made of the gender
dynamics of village elections and governance
processes, which serve to exclude most women




In this article, we outlined both key barriers
to women’s political participation in village
committees and some of the favourable factors
that might promote greater participation of
women. For the moment, it seems that the
weight of the barriers exceeds the pressure of
counter-forces. This is not least because struc-
tural factors such as women’s dominance in
agriculture in many parts of China, the gen-
dered effects of land reform, and their conti-
nuing prime responsibility for household work
and caring leave them with little extra time or
energy to take on additional tasks.
Moreover, the persistence of gendered
norms and values that devalue women’s work
and limit women’s roles in the public sphere
of politics is difficult to unsettle. Nevertheless,
the wider horizons and higher expectations of
rural migrant women may translate at some
point into a demand for a greater role in village
affairs beyond the traditional areas of family
planning and women’s work.
Growing discontent in rural areas coupled
with an increasing rights consciousness amongst
farmers and migrant workers may create the
conditions where women can break out into
male-dominated politics. What is clear is that
this is an area that deserves far greater attention
than it has been given by Chinese and foreign
scholars and by Party/government officials.
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Jude Howell, Élections villageoises en Chine : perspec-
tives récentes, nouveaux défis
L’introduction progressive d’élections villageoises en
Chine a retenu toute l’attention des politiques, chercheurs
et autres analystes, en Chine comme à l’étranger. Or ce
processus a conduit à une diminution de la représentation
des femmes au sein des comités villageois. Après avoir
décrit le déroulement des élections villageoises, l’auteur
évoque les controverses qu’a fait naître l’idée de compé-
tition, les problèmes qui en ont résulté et la manière dont
ces élections ont été traitées dans la littérature. Puis elle
s’intéresse à la répartition hommes/femmes dans les
comités villageois tout en resituant cette question dans
le contexte plus général de la participation des femmes
à la vie politique chinoise. Sont ensuite examinés les prin-
cipaux facteurs qui expliquent la faible représentation des
femmes dans ces comités élus, et ce à partir d’enquêtes
menées dans les provinces du Hunan et du Shandong.
Pour finir, sont explorées quelques-unes des mesures qui,
à l’avenir, pourraient permettre d’accroître cette repré-
sentation.
Mots clés
élections villageoises, Fédération des femmes, genre,
participation politique des femmes
Abstract
Jude Howell, Village Elections in China: Recent Pros-
pects, New Challenges
The gradual introduction of village elections across
China has drawn considerable attention from policy-ma-
kers, scholars and analysts both within China and abroad.
These elections have led to a decline in the representation
of women on village committees. The gender aspects of
this trend are examined. An overview of this process dis-
cusses the controversies surrounding the idea of compe-
titive elections, the issues that have arisen, and the way
these elections have been treated in the literature. The
gender composition of village committees is placed in
the broader context of women’s participation in Chinese
politics. Findings from fieldwork carried out in Hunan
and Shandong provinces are used to shade light on the
factors limiting women’s participation. Some factors that
might improve women’s involvement in politics are
brought under consideration.
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